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INTRODUCTION
The case of Border v Lewisham and Greenwich NHS Trust deals with the controversial topic of exactly how assertive the courts will be in determining what constitutes reasonable medical professional practice. This is in relation to both clinical decision-25 making and, more specifically, the clinical duty to ensure that in the case of competent adult patients the patient's consent is secured. This decision was an appeal from the court of first instance where Moloney J dismissed the claimant's case for clinical negligence. Permission to appeal was granted on a single ground, the issue of the patient's consent. The events that gave rise to the claim took place in 2008, when the claimant, 30 then aged 64, was admitted with a suspected broken right humerus to the Accident and Emergency department, specifically the resuscitation room of the Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Woolwich. Dr Prenter was the senior house officer on duty. On her admission and examination, he had decided immediately to insert a cannula into the claimant, as was standard practice. As the right arm was broken it was not a suitable 35 site, ordinarily the left arm would have been the usual site, but in this case the claimant had recently had a left mammectomy and axillary node clearance, which meant that the arm was more susceptible to developing an infection and oedema. Mrs Border had informed Dr Prenter both about the recent prior procedure and about her reservations regarding the insertion of the cannula in this situation, as soon as the 40 issue of insertion arose. Dr Prenter would have known exactly what Mrs Border was referring to, when she informed him of the problem with her left arm as the risk of an oedema after a mammectomy and axillary node clearance is one well understood by Accident and Emergency doctors. Moloney J held that 'there was an obviously cogent reason' to avoid the arm if a third site could be found.
1 Notwithstanding this and 45 despite the claimant's attempts to alert him about her concerns, Dr Prenter proceeded to insert the cannula into the left arm. Unfortunately the claimant did develop an infection, which left her with a fairly serious permanent disability in her left arm. The claim was brought in negligence alone, the focus of the case at first instance being whether Dr Prenter had acted in accordance with accepted medical practice in insert-
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ing the cannula when he did. There was little significance given to the issue of consent, which later assumed a central place in the appeal. by an individual of unusual specialist skill in the manner of Defreitas v O'Brien.
11 Also, once Moloney J determined that Dr Prenter 'was acting in the way which many, 100 perhaps the great majority of doctors would have done', he drew the conclusion that Dr Prenter's decision to insert the cannula was not negligent 'even though it proved not to be strictly necessary and to have serious consequences for the claimant'.
12 It is just this sort of reasoning-the equating of common practice with reasonable practice without a thorough risk/benefit analysis-which brought the Bolam test into disre-105 pute and subjected it to much academic criticism. 13 Moloney J held that the reasoning of Dr Prenter and his expert Mr Hayworth with regard to inserting the cannula into the left arm immediately was logical. He did not find that Dr Prenter's decision was so flawed as to bring it into the Hucks v Cole 14 lacuna category. There the defendant had failed to treat a new mother suffering with 110 an infected finger with penicillin, known to be a bacteriocidal, rather than tetracycline which was not. The patient subsequently suffered puerpal Q3 septicaemia and brought proceedings in negligence. Two of the judges found that Dr Cole was negligent, but neglected to elaborate. Sachs LJ was satisfied that if penicillin had been administered, the infection would not have occurred and the patient would have avoided serious 115 injury. He said that unless there was a good reason for not administering it: the onset was due to a lacuna between what could easily have been done and what was infact done. According to the defence, the lacuna was consistent with and accorded with reasonable practice of others with obstetric experience. When the evidence shows that a lacuna in professional practice exists by which 120 risks of great danger are knowingly taken, then, however small the risks, the courts must anxiously examine the lacuna-particularly if the risks can be easily and inexpensively avoided. If the court finds on analysis of the reasons given for not taking the precautions that, in the light of current professional knowledge, there is no proper basis for that lacuna and it is definitely not reasonable that 125 those risks should have been taken, its function is to state the fact and where necessary to state that it constitutes negligence . . . On such occasions the fact that other practitioners would have done the same thing as the defendant practitioner is a very weighty matter to be put on the scales on his behalf but it is not conclusive. an injury to his head and was discharged the following day after X-rays and neurological observations. He continued with headaches, lethargy, and loss of appetite, his GP visited and advised the claimant's wife to telephone him if the claimant deterio-135 rated and suggested analgesics for the headaches. Four days later the claimant's condition deteriorated, and following emergency surgery to repair a skull fracture, he was left paralysed with a speech disorder. Judge Alton found:
. . . a court must clearly be reluctant to depart from the view of an apparently careful and prudent general practitioner, I have concluded that, if there was a 140 body of professional opinion which supports the course of leaving the patient who has some seven days previously sustained a head injury at home in circumstances where he continues to complain of headaches, drowsiness, etc., and where there continues to be a risk of the existence of an intracranial lesion which could cause a sudden and disastrous collapse, then such a view is not 145 reasonably prudent.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant doctor's appeal on the basis that the judge was entitled to find that it could not be a reasonable exercise of a GP's discretion to leave the patient at home rather than readmit to hospital. It could be submitted that the decision by Dr Prenter in Mrs Border's case, to insert the cannula immedi-150 ately without any consideration of the comparative risks and benefits of the proposed treatment, might not amount to a reasonable exercise of an A&E doctors discretion.
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It is perhaps more difficult to assert that his decision fell within the they might prove to be so rare as to be almost non-existent. 24 It is contended that Bolitho could go awry in the same way Bolam did. The adjective 'logical' does not prevent prescriptive and descriptive standards becoming confused. Mulheron acknowledged that it has already been judicially recognised that it will be difficult to apply
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Bolitho where a distinguished expert in the field considered the accused doctor's treatment or diagnosis to be a reasonable one. 25 The post-Bolitho case law does provide examples of the courts behaving assertively, when setting the standard of care in clinical negligence. 26 However, while less numerous, there are also decisions that deliver a more explicitly cautious message as to the approach that will be taken. 27 The concern 170 raised by this later group of cases being Bolitho has done little to counter the most fundamental prohibitive influences that act on the judicial consciousness, i.e. concern as to resource implications for the NHS, the entrenched 'special' respect for medical professionals, the persistence of viewing clinical negligence as ideologically distinct from other forms of the tort including erroneous treatment of common practice via the mis-175 representation of Bolam. It is contended here that the decision in Border reiterates that the adjective 'logical' does not prevent prescriptive and descriptive standards from being potentially confused. Also, Moloney J's reference to Dr Evans testimony as a 'highly experienced' consultant might be revisited here as possible evidence that the old prohibitive influences do still impact upon the judicial consciousness when it 180 comes to their acting assertively as the ultimate arbiters of the appropriate standard of care. 28 The Court of Appeal noted how Moloney J had: 'accepted the implication of Mr Hayworth's evidence that he would have put the cannula into the left arm immediately, accepting the slight risk of the oedema as preferable to the unknown risk which might occur in the near future' without question. 29 Furthermore, they were not pre-185 pared to find that the running of a risk in order to avoid another as yet non-existent risk was not logical. Reassuringly the Court of Appeal were emphatic that Moloney J was wrong to regard consent as unimportant, but they unfortunately failed to question his approach on the weight to be accorded to accepted medical practice. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENT
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The claimant's case on appeal was materially different to that which was argued before Moloney J Counsel for the claimant focussed on Dr Prenter's failure to gain the claimant's consent before inserting the cannula and how that was a breach of his professional duty to take care of the claimant. Counsel for the defendant accepted that both the paramountcy of patient autonomy and the principle that treatment 195 without consent in the case of a competent adult should lead to a finding of breach of the duty to take care in negligence but contended that in this instance the claimant had impliedly consented to the procedure. Moreover, counsel for the defence contended it was for the claimant to prove an absence of consent, yet Moloney J was not asked to find that treatment proceeded without her consent. Richards LJ found that
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Moloney J did not accept on the evidence before him that the patient had impliedly consented to the insertion of the cannula by holding out her arm. He noted that reference to the transcript of the trial showed that there was a factual dispute between the defendant and the claimant on this issue. The claimant asserted that Dr Prenter did not discuss the issue and rather just stated, 'I don't have any choice' before insertion 205 of the cannula. Dr Prenter, on the other hand, claimed he had given her a substantial explanation that insertion of the cannula was the safest option. Moloney J was clear that he did not accept Dr Prenter's evidence, that Mrs Border positively albeit impliedly, consented to the treatment by holding out her arm in a co-operative manner. Richards LJ refused to accept the respondent's contention that Moloney J 210 was wrong to prefer the claimant's evidence on this issue given there was no basis for the appellate court to interfere with the finding of fact.
Having made a finding of absence of consent, Moloney J took the issue no further, as he appeared to be under the misapprehension that because this was occurring in the resuscitation room that was the end of the matter. 30 Richards LJ speculated that
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Moloney J might have had in mind the principle that in a medical emergency where the patient is incapable of giving consent a doctor might proceed without consent provided he is acting in the patient's best interests as applicable to the situation before him. 31 However, the Court of Appeal was resoundingly clear that just because the resuscitation room was an emergency setting, it did not automatically mean that the 220 doctrine of necessity could be automatically utilised. The claimant in this case was fully conscious and in the Court of Appeal's view was capable of giving or withholding her consent. This was a timely reminder, if one was needed, that the emergency setting was not of particular relevance when dealing with a competent patient, and certainly not to the extent that the doctrine of necessity could immediately circum-225 vent a competent adult patients right to decide whether to consent to or refuse a particular treatment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held that a finding of absence of consent should have led Moloney J to find that Dr Prenter had breached his duty of care, notwithstanding the particulars of the claim at the trial. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the duty to obtain a patient's consent was a fundamental principle competent patient of the risks of treatment, thus allowing them to make an informed decision about their own medical treatment. He cited with approval the judgment in Chester v Afshar and held that breach of this duty to gain consent was established, but noted that the issue of causation remained, and was best dealt with by the original 235 trial judge. 32 It is perhaps disappointing that the court took this view when the words of Lord Hope are remembered:
The function of the law is to protect the patient's right to choose. If it is to fulfil that function it must ensure that the duty to inform is respected by the doctor. It will fail to do this if an appropriate remedy cannot be given if the duty is brea-240 ched and the very risk which the patient should have been told about occurs and she suffers injury. 33 Counsel for the appellant sought permission to amend the particulars of the claim so as to add a claim for trespass to the person as he submitted that the insertion of the cannula was a technical battery. The Court of Appeal refused to allow the amendment 245 which would have permitted them to consider the claim of trespass to the person. That they should refuse this is of some concern despite the technicalities of the issue. Although not made explicit, Moloney J did indeed find a lack of consent from Mrs Border, holding that he did not accept the defendant's 'suggestion that she laid out her arm in a co-operative manner' and that he preferred Mrs Border's evidence, that 250 she 'hardly realised until after it was done'. 34 Thus, having ruled that Mrs Border did not consent either expressly or impliedly, and given that she was a competent adult, what followed was prima facie a battery and not in accordance with the classic statement from Cardozo J in Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital that:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 255 what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without an operation without his patients consent commits a battery. Review 102 who asserted that it was the Lords decision in this case which 'gave legitimacy to assertions that the law in England . . . requires patients to be properly informed about proposed treatment, a claim which until now had little weight'. 33 [2004] UKHL 41 at [56] . It is argued here that the duty to gain consent was breached in a most explicit way in Mrs Borders case as she was actively voicing concerns about the proposed treatment and there was no evidence of any serious attempt being made to counsel her as to the consequences of her refusal but instead her decision was ignored. When human life is a stake the pressure to provide an affirmative answer authorising unwanted medical intervention is very powerful. Nevertheless the autonomy of each individual requires continuing protection even, perhaps particularly when 265 the motive for interfering with it is readily understandable, and indeed to many would appear commendable 37 As Jones contends, it is not completely clear cut where the burden of proof rests in the battery action. 38 Although Freeman v The Home Office 39 challenged the traditional view that consent operated as a defence to a battery when the court held the claimant 270 had the burden of proof. 40 There is a wealth of authority which categorises consent as a defence, and if that is actually its correct categorisation, it should be for the defendant to prove that the claimant consented. 41 Jones further points out that in Canada
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and Australia 43 consent is undoubtedly regarded as a defence. 44 There is some Canadian authority, which although tenuous could perhaps have been utilised by a court 275 who were minded, not only to send a strong message on the importance of consent, but who were also minded to provide an aggrieved patient with effective redress. In Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital 45 with facts strangely reminiscent of the current case: the claimant gave an anaesthetist specific instructions not to touch her left arm as she had experienced problems with doctors who had tried to find a vein there in 280 the past. The defendant replied that he knew what he was doing and proceeded to administer the anaesthetic by needle into her left arm. During the surgery the anaesthesia leaked into the tissues interstitially, instead of through the vein causing the Without consent, either written or oral, no surgery may be performed. That is not a mere formality; it is an important individual right to have control over one's body, even where medical treatment is involved. It is the patient, and not the doctor, who decides whether surgery will be performed, where it will be done. . . 46 The High Court of Ontario held that although the doctor was not negligent he was 290 liable in battery. 47 As Jones 48 explained, Linden J in a later case 49 citing Reibl v Hughes 50 held 'that the law of battery remains available where there is no consent to the operation'.
A NEW ERA OF JUDICIAL ASSERTIVENESS?
That the Court of Appeal found for the claimant at all is notable given the poor 295 record which contested clinical negligence cases have, particularly in front of the higher courts. 51 As even where the decision is received by academics as an assertive one the end result is often still the same, the claimant loses. 52 For example, it has been asserted that the rhetoric of Bolitho did not match the outcome. 53 The following questions have been posed on numerous occasions; why is it that the medical profes- [a]n adult person of sound mind is entitled which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in the recommended treatment and of any reasonable 310 alternatives or variant treatments.
It remains to be seen for certain whether this year could really see the end of the old sentiment of doctor (automatically) knowing best. In the case of Mrs Border at least, she is yet to succeed in her claim, if success is measured by the award of damages. If Montgomery is followed to its logical conclusion does this mean not only 315 that there will have been a fundamental change in the law for information disclosure cases 55 but also that Bolam with all its various adjectives (reasonable, responsible, logical) will never quite be the same again? Moreover, whether a medical practice is of the acceptable standard of care must ultimately (in the case of competent adults at least) require consideration of the patient's views in concert with the professionals.
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Jackson LJ recently predicted that the attacks on Bolam would continue and possibly succeed and that 'if that happens, the court will set the standards for professional persons in the same way that it sets the standards for everybody else, paying due regard to any relevant evidence of practice and any relevant expert evidence'. 56 It is respectfully contended that such practice need not be seen as an attack on Bolam but 325
